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EVIDENCE-BASED PROMULGATION:
RECONSIDERING THE RULEMAKING PROCESS
FOR RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Emily S. Taylor Poppe*
Annika asked anxiously, . . . . “isn’t there any mother or father here?”
“No, not one,” said Pippi cheerfully.
“But who tells you to go to bed at night and things like that?” asked
Annika.
“I do,” said Pippi. “First I tell myself once, very nicely, and if I don’t
obey, then I tell myself again, very sternly, and if I still don’t obey, then
it’s time for a spanking, of course.”
—Astrid Lindgren, Pippi Longstocking1

INTRODUCTION
Much like the indomitable Pippi Longstocking, the legal profession has
succeeded for decades in asserting its right to self-regulate.2 Judges play a
key role in this regulatory regime, serving as both rulemakers and enforcers.3
Indeed, prompted by the efforts of the organized bar,4 the judiciary claims
the inherent—and exclusive—right to regulate the practice of law on the

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law. This Article
was prepared for the Colloquium entitled The Judicial Role in Professional Regulation, hosted
by the Fordham Law Review and the Stein Center for Law and Ethics on October 9, 2020, at
Fordham University School of Law. Thank you to Professor Bruce A. Green for the invitation
to participate and to participants for their helpful feedback. Thank you also to Alaina Persinger
and Harrison Weimer for their valuable research assistance.
1. ASTRID LINDGREN, PIPPI LONGSTOCKING 19 (Tiina Nunnally trans., Viking Press
2007) (1945).
2. Indeed, self-regulation is one of the defining characteristics of the professions. See
Abraham Flexner, Is Social Work a Profession?, 42 NAT’L CONF. CHARITIES & CORR. 576,
581 (1915), reprinted in 11 RSCH. ON SOC. WORK PRAC. 152, 156 (2001) (noting that
professions “tend to self-organization”).
3. See, e.g., Eli Wald, Should Judges Regulate Lawyers?, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 149,
152–53 (2010) (noting judges’ multiple roles in regulating the legal profession).
4. Laurel A. Rigertas, Lobbying and Litigating Against “Legal Bootleggers”—the Role
of the Organized Bar in the Expansion of the Courts’ Inherent Powers in the Early Twentieth
Century, 46 CAL. W. L. REV. 65, 68–69 (2009) (describing the role of the organized bar in
shaping the basis for professional self-regulation).
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basis of the separation of powers doctrine.5 This claimed right includes
establishing the boundaries of what constitutes the practice of law, thus
effectively maintaining the profession’s monopoly over the provision of legal
services.6
Yet this arrangement is under attack on several fronts. Lawyers
increasingly face regulation from other quarters.7 Much of this regulation is
federal, occurring through the application of substantive federal law and the
regulation of lawyers appearing before certain federal agencies.8 Indeed, the
multijurisdictional nature of modern practice has led to calls to move beyond
this piecemeal encroachment in favor of the federalization of professional
regulation.9 However, there are also other sources of authority that shape
lawyers’ behavior, including malpractice insurers,10 title insurers,11 and
professional organizations.12 In addition, international jurisdictions also
impose obligations on lawyers and exert further pressure on the existing U.S.
regulatory system through the adoption of innovative regulations.13
Meanwhile, the profession’s ongoing failure to address inequalities in
access to justice provokes further opposition to the existing regulatory
regime. Decades of empirical research documents the public’s limited use of
lawyers to address civil legal problems.14 Building on this evidence, many
5. Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation—the Role of the InherentPowers Doctrine, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 1, 14–16 (1989) (describing courts’ use of the
negative inherent-powers doctrine to exert exclusive control over the legal profession). The
premise that the judiciary possesses the exclusive authority to regulate the legal profession is
challenged in theory and practice. See Wald, supra note 3, at 155.
6. Wolfram, supra note 5, at 15–16.
7. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 3, at 156; David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate
Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 803 (1992).
8. Daniel R. Coquillette & Judith A. McMorrow, Zacharias’s Prophecy: The
Federalization of Legal Ethics Through Legislative, Court, and Agency Regulation, 48 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 123, 128, 132 (2011).
9. See Eli Wald, Federalizing Legal Ethics, Nationalizing Law Practice, and the Future
of the American Legal Profession in a Global Age, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 489, 531 (2011)
(proposing national practice rules but with the reservation of state control over other aspects
of professional regulation); Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV.
335, 379–80 (1994) (offering an early prediction of this shift and advocating for the
federalization of legal ethics).
10. Anthony E. Davis, Professional Liability Insurers as Regulators of Law Practice, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 209, 210 (1996); Leslie C. Levin, Regulators at the Margins: The Impact
of Malpractice Insurers on Solo and Small Firm Lawyers, 49 CONN. L. REV. 553, 595 (2016)
(finding evidence of insurance having a modest impact on insured lawyers’ conduct).
11. Levin, supra note 10, at 604–08 (describing ways in which lawyers’ behavior is
shaped by requirements governing title agents).
12. Mona L. Hymel, Controlling Lawyer Behavior: The Sources and Uses of Protocols
in Governing Law Practice, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 873, 891 (2002) (noting, for example, protocols
for lawyer behavior issued by the American College of Trusts and Estates Counsel and the
American Bar Association Business Law Section).
13. Coquillette & McMorrow, supra note 8, at 146–47 (“Competition from international
firms for a worldwide market for legal services also pressures U.S. regulatory structures to
consider alternate models being adopted abroad.”).
14. See, e.g., Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes:
Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 525, 546 (1980); see also REBECCA
L. SANDEFUR, AM. BAR FOUND., ACCESSING JUSTICE IN THE CONTEMPORARY USA: FINDINGS
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access to justice scholars and practitioners advocate a move away from
exclusive reliance on traditional lawyer- and court-centric approaches to
equalizing access to justice.15 These proposals are buttressed by a growing
body of empirical evidence documenting the benefits offered by nonlawyer
legal service providers16 and the dearth of evidence that consumers are
harmed by alternative sources of legal assistance.17
Among these alternative sources of legal assistance are various forms of
legal technology. As these technologies become more sophisticated, moving
from the delivery of static legal information to drafting legal documents and
answering legal questions, they veer closer to the practice of law. However,
some see these technologies as having the potential to expand access to
justice, either by obviating the need for recourse to a lawyer18 or by making
lawyers more efficient such that latent markets can be economically served.19
This potential makes it more politically difficult to constrain their

FROM
THE
COMMUNITY
NEEDS
AND
SERVICES
STUDY
12
(2014),
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/sandefur_accessing_justice_
in_the_contemporary_usa._aug._2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/64KQ-82J8] (documenting the
very limited use of lawyers, despite the prevalence of civil legal problems, among a sample of
residents in a midwestern city). This finding is consistent with studies in other countries. See
OECD & OPEN SOC’Y FOUNDS., LEGAL NEEDS SURVEYS AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE 33–34
(2019), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/g2g9a36c-en.pdf?expires=1609961717&id
=id&accname=guest&checksum=90B0AB10172D2814D16E431BB2756C65
[https://perma.cc/SFZ8-V4S6] (noting similar findings in a number of foreign jurisdictions);
see also LEGAL SERVS. CORP., THE JUSTICE GAP: MEASURING THE UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS
OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 6 (2017), https://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/images/
TheJusticeGap-FullReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/HP5C-W3DW] (“86% of the civil legal
problems reported by low-income Americans in the past year received inadequate or no legal
help.”).
15. See, e.g., Pascoe Pleasence & Nigel J. Balmer, Justice & the Capability to Function
in Society, DÆDALUS, Winter 2019, at 140, 141; Rebecca L. Sandefur, Access to What?,
DÆDALUS, Winter 2019, at 49, 49–50 (2019).
16. See, e.g., REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & THOMAS M. CLARKE, ROLES BEYOND LAWYERS:
SUMMARY,
RECOMMENDATIONS
AND
RESEARCH
REPORT
4
(2016)
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/new_york_city_court_navig
ators_report_final_with_final_links_december_2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/79ZZ-A92U]
(reporting results of an evaluation analysis of multiple nonlawyer legal intervention programs
and finding “evidence that assistance from appropriately trained and supervised individuals
without formal legal training is associated with changes in a range of outcomes, including both
legal and real-life outcomes”).
17. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, The Delivery of Legal Services by Non-lawyers, 4 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 209, 214–15 (1990). The existence of randomized control studies that fail to
find that individuals who receive an offer of legal assistance achieve more favorable outcomes
further fuels the debate. See, e.g., James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized
Evaluation in Legal Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use)
Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118, 2118 (2012).
18. See Benjamin H. Barton, Technology Can Solve Much of America’s Access to Justice
Problem, If We Let It, in BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 444, 445
(Samuel Estreicher & Joy Radice eds., 2016).
19. See Albert H. Yoon, The Post-modern Lawyer: Technology and the Democratization
of Legal Representation, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 456, 470–71 (2016).
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development.20 Whether this techno-optimism is justified is debatable,21 but
it has nevertheless inspired calls for regulatory reform to enable these access
to justice developments.22
Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in North Carolina Board of
Dental Examiners v. FTC23 raises the specter of antitrust actions against the
current regulatory scheme actors.24 In that case, the Supreme Court held that
the North Carolina state dental board, which included a controlling number
of active market participants, was not entitled to automatic state-action
immunity from antitrust investigation.25 There has long been criticism that
self-interest motivates the regulation of the legal profession;26 the holding in
North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners has the potential to give
consequence to these concerns.27
Reflecting these pressures, the American Bar Association (ABA) passed
Resolution 115 in February 2020, after substantial debate.28 The resolution
20. See, e.g., STATE BAR OF CAL. TASK FORCE ON ACCESS THROUGH INNOVATION OF LEGAL
SERVS., FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 3 (2020), http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/
documents/publicComment/ATILS-Final-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UV8-EFQD] (“The
work of [the Task Force on Access Through Innovation of Legal Services] was animated by
the inescapable conclusion that nearly all Californians are facing severe challenges in
obtaining access to legal services for commonly encountered legal problems.”).
21. See REBECCA L. SANDEFUR ET AL., LEGAL TECH FOR NON-LAWYERS: REPORT OF THE
SURVEY OF US LEGAL TECHNOLOGIES 14–16 (2019), http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/
uploads/cms/documents/report_us_digital_legal_tech_for_nonlawyers.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5U72-D2FU] (noting the limitations of existing legal technology aimed at
expanding access to justice); Tanina Rostain, Techno-optimism & Access to the Legal System,
DÆDALUS, Winter 2019, at 93, 94 (cautioning against unsubstantiated techno-optimism).
22. See, e.g., Barton, supra note 18, at 445 (noting that “[t]he greatest danger to the power
of technology [to expand access to civil justice] is the beneficiaries of the status quo”).
23. 574 U.S. 494 (2015).
24. Elizabeth Chambliss, Evidence-Based Lawyer Regulation, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 297,
309 (2019) (noting that the case “signaled the end of [the] laissez-faire approach to
professional self-regulation”).
25. N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 574 U.S. at 515 (“The Sherman Act protects competition
while also respecting federalism. It does not authorize the States to abandon markets to the
unsupervised control of active market participants . . . .”).
26. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on Multidisciplinary
Practice: Their Derivation, Their Development, and Some Implications for the Core Values
Debate, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1115, 1118 (2000) (noting the evolving but consistently selfinterested bases for regulations preventing lawyers’ association with nonlawyers); Deborah L.
Rhode, Professional Integrity and Professional Regulation: Nonlawyer Practice and
Nonlawyer Investment in Law Firms, 39 HASTINGS INT’L & COMPAR. L. REV. 111, 114–15
(2016). Scholars have long recognized the inherent potential for self-interest in self-regulatory
regimes more generally. See, e.g., Flexner, supra note 2, at 156 (“There is, of course, always
danger that the interests of [a professional] organization may conflict with those of the body
politic.”).
27. See Chambliss, supra note 24, at 300–01; Deborah L. Rhode & Benjamin H. Barton,
Rethinking Self-Regulation: Antitrust Perspectives on Bar Governance Activity, 20 CHAP. L.
REV. 267, 280 (2017).
28. Matt Reynolds, To Increase Access to Justice, Regulatory Innovation Should Be
Considered, ABA House Says, ABA J. (Feb. 17, 2020), https://www.abajournal.com/
news/article/resolution-115 [https://perma.cc/LT6D-YZYW] (reporting on the resolution’s
passage). Similar debates occurred in response to ABA Resolution 105, which adopted the
ABA Model Regulatory Objectives for the Provision of Legal Services. See Chambliss, supra
note 24, at 315.
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“encourages U.S. jurisdictions to consider regulatory innovations” to address
the access to justice crisis.29 Although the adopted resolution provides that
nothing in it “should be construed as recommending any changes to any of
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct,”30 this compromise language
belies the pressure for reform indicated by the resolution as a whole.31 After
decades of being encouraged to achieve uniformity in professional
regulation, state regulators face increasing pressure to chart their own paths.
As they do so, ABA Resolution 115 “encourages U.S. jurisdictions to
collect and assess data regarding regulatory innovations both before and after
their adoption.”32 Scholars have also called for a shift toward evidence-based
regulation, noting its potential to counter challenges to the current regulatory
regime.33 This shift mirrors trends in access to justice34 and the law more
broadly.35 Yet these proposals have generally been limited to the substance
of professional regulation. In this Article, I propose an additional shift—one
toward evidence-based promulgation.
State supreme courts have long been criticized for their work in
promulgating rules of professional conduct. In particular, they are accused
of abdicating their responsibility by delegating the work of drafting to the
organized bar, which is seen as evidence of self-interested action and ingroup bias in favor of lawyers.36 On these grounds, multiple institutional
analyses have concluded that other institutions are better suited to the task of
regulating the legal profession.37 However, these analyses have generally
presumed the current formulation of judicial regulation in their analyses.38

29. AM. BAR ASS’N, REVISED RESOLUTION 115 AND REPORT (2020) [hereinafter ABA
RESOLUTION 115], https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/center-forinnovation/r115resandreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LCS-9VGL] (providing the revised
resolution and final report).
30. Id.
31. Reynolds, supra note 28.
32. ABA RESOLUTION 115, supra note 29, at 1.
33. Chambliss, supra note 24, at 304 (arguing that evidence-based regulation provides the
most prudent response to challenges to self-regulation, including the growing body of
evidence supporting the value of nonlawyer legal service providers).
34. See Catherine R. Albiston & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Expanding the Empirical Study of
Access to Justice, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 101, 103 (noting the increasing interest in access to justice
research and calling for empirical investigation that could lead to more effective
interventions).
35. See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond, Empirical Legal Scholarship: Observations on
Moving Forward, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1229, 1229–31 (2019) (tracking the growth of empirical
legal scholarship).
36. Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should
Control Lawyer Regulation—Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167, 1208
(2003) (“State supreme courts have satisfied their own and lawyers’ interests by delegating
virtually all of their regulatory authority under the vaunted system of ‘lawyer selfregulation.’”).
37. Id. at 1172–73 (arguing that Congress or state legislatures are better positioned to
regulate lawyers); see also Wilkins, supra note 7, at 875–76 (performing an institutional
analysis focused on enforcement of disciplinary rules).
38. See Wald, supra note 3, at 158–60; Zacharias, supra note 9, at 338 (“My conclusion
that the federalization of legal ethics may be inevitable rests largely on states’ failure to
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In this Article, I ask how empirical evidence could be harnessed to reform
the rule promulgation process and whether doing so might overcome
objections to the current model.39
I begin by considering states’ current processes for promulgating rules. I
identify many overlapping sources of legal authority that can inform
promulgation and describe some of the key dimensions on which
promulgation processes vary.40 Importantly, I also note that, despite the
framework of authority that surrounds the promulgation process, it remains
one that is largely discretionary.
Building on these insights, I consider how states might use empirical
evidence to reform rule promulgation.41 This includes drawing on best
practices developed in other rulemaking contexts, developing mechanisms
for integrating external expertise, formalizing consumer protections, and
considering the composition of rulemakers. Together, these insights may
inform the creation of standardized promulgation processes designed to
improve the regulation of the profession.
In arguing for a shift to evidence-based promulgation, I extend the existing
call for evidence-based regulation.42 I suggest that this shift offers a potential
way forward for the regulation of the profession, addressing the alleged
hypocrisy and inefficacy of the existing scheme without resorting to more
radical alternatives. However, reflecting on the profession’s history of selfregulation, I also acknowledge the barriers to adopting evidence-based
promulgation. Even if these barriers are overcome, I also recognize that the
implementation of these processes may fail to address other underlying
problems with the current regulatory regime.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I considers variation in the rule
promulgation process across the states. Part II identifies ways in which the
promulgation process might be reformed on the basis of empirical evidence.
Part III considers the potential benefits and limitations to this approach and
is followed by a brief conclusion.
I. THE PROMULGATION PROCESS
Although the highest court in each state is responsible for adopting rules
of professional conduct, these courts have historically delegated much of
their responsibility to the organized bar in that state.43 This delegation is
address the problems I identify and on my sense that states will not address those problems
aggressively in the future.”).
39. In doing so, I take seriously the suggestion that we examine the judicial role in the
rulemaking process. Wald, supra note 3, at 161 (advocating that “the public should not take
judicial promulgation of rules of conduct for granted, but instead subject it to close scrutiny”);
see also Barton, supra note 36, at 1171 n.14 (“Given a problematic regulatory outcome,
administrative law scholars suggest a close analysis of the regulatory process to determine
what changes, if any, might improve the regulatory output.”).
40. See infra Part I.
41. See infra Part II.
42. See infra Part III.
43. Green, supra note 26, at 1136.
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illustrated most clearly by the role of the ABA in drafting the model rules of
conduct that have been adopted in most states.44 The ABA also facilitates a
comment period on proposed revisions and offers states a guide to implement
the model rules.45 Through these activities the ABA determines the timing
and substance of reforms and also oversees the national discourse on
professional regulation.
The outsized role of the ABA and general structural similarities across
state promulgation processes have tended to overshadow procedural
variation among the states. These processes are regulated by multiple
overlapping sources of authority, including state constitutions, statutory
provisions governing occupational licensure and government transparency,
court rules adopted by the states’ highest courts, and—if any rulemaking
authority is delegated to the state bar—bylaws of the state bar associations.46
Layered on top of these binding provisions are customary practices that may
be applied consistently or on an ad hoc basis.
The multiple sources of authority that govern the promulgation process in
Maryland illustrate well the multifaceted regulation of professional conduct
rulemaking. Maryland’s constitution establishes the rulemaking authority of
the state’s highest court, providing that “[t]he Court of Appeals from time to
time shall adopt rules and regulations concerning the practice and procedure
in and the administration of the appellate courts and in the other courts of this
State.”47 A state statutory provision authorizes the court to delegate its
rulemaking authority: “To aid in the exercise of its rulemaking powers, the
Court of Appeals may appoint a standing committee of lawyers, judges, and
other persons competent in judicial practice, procedure or administration.”48
Such a committee, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, has been in place pursuant to court of appeals appointment since
1946.49 The Standing Committee may, in turn, delegate some of its
responsibilities to subcommittees, although these are “not public bodies, (not
having been created by statute or Rule).”50

44. See Alphabetical List of Jurisdictions Adopting Model Rules, AM. BAR ASS’N (Mar.
28, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/
model_rules_of_professional_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules
[https://perma.cc/9MQF-PT6N].
45. See Policy & Initiatives, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional_responsibility/policy [https://perma.cc/W5HX-ES27] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021)
(“The Center Policy Implementation Committee provides assistance to jurisdictions on the
review and implementation of adopted policy . . . .”).
46. See Appendix (identifying examples, by state, of legal authority controlling the
promulgation process and descriptions of the promulgation process).
47. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 18(a).
48. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 13-301 (LexisNexis 2020).
49. Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, MD. CTS.,
https://www.mdcourts.gov/rules [https://perma.cc/7977-S9HC] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021)
(noting that this committee replaced an ad hoc committee established in 1940).
50. MD. STANDING COMM. ON RULES AND PROC., 205TH REPORT TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS: NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULES CHANGES 3 (2020), https://www.mdcourts.gov/sites/
default/files/rules/reports/205threport.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MMS-FQY5].
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The composition of the Standing Committee is directed by court rule,
which provides that the committee
shall consist of one incumbent judge of the Court of Special Appeals, three
incumbent circuit court judges, three incumbent judges of the District
Court, one member of the State Senate, one member of the House of
Delegates, one clerk of a circuit court, and such other individuals
determined by the Court of Appeals.51

Court rules also govern the terms for which these committee members
serve.52
Other rules adopted by the state’s highest court require that the Standing
Committee post notice of all its meetings on the judiciary’s website and that
all meetings must be open to the public.53 Because it is a public body, the
Standing Committee is also subject to the state’s Open Meetings Act,54 which
similarly requires public notice of meetings,55 posting of meeting agendas,56
and open attendance.57 Together, these provisions effectively require that
proposed amendments to the state’s rules of professional conduct are subject
to public notice, although there is no rule requiring a formal notice and
comment period.
Notably, the Maryland State Bar Association is not formally incorporated
into this process. The Maryland State Bar Association maintains a
Committee on Rules of Practice, the “principal function” of which “is to
follow the proceedings of the Maryland Court of Appeals’ Rules Committee
and to serve as the liaison between the MSBA and the Court’s Rules
Committee.”58 However, this bar association committee exists outside of the
formal promulgation process laid out by state law and rules.
Thus, the Maryland promulgation process remains under the auspices of
the state supreme court, is largely carried out by a committee of judges and
legislators appointed by that court, and does not explicitly involve the state
bar. In many ways, the process is quite formalized, at least in terms of the
parties involved and the requirements regarding public notice. At the same
time, despite the formalization of this process, the court retains discretion.
For example, court rules provide that, “[u]nless the Court of Appeals
determines otherwise, every suggestion made to it for the adoption,
amendment, or rescission of a Maryland Rule shall be referred to the Rules

51. MD. CT. R. 16-701(b). For the current composition of the Standing Committee, see
Court of Appeals Committees: Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, MD.
MANUAL ON-LINE (Nov. 13, 2020), https://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/29ap/html/
rules.html [https://perma.cc/3XN9-RDKP].
52. MD. CT. R. 16-701(d).
53. Id. r. 16-701(f).
54. MD. CODE ANN., GEN. PROV. § 3-301–501 (LexisNexis 2020).
55. Id. § 3-302.
56. Id. § 3-302.1.
57. Id. § 3-303.
58. MBSA Committee: Rules of Practice, MD. STATE BAR ASS’N, https://www.msba.org/
for-members/committees/rules-of-practice [https://perma.cc/DXP9-3GTT] (last visited Jan.
27, 2021).
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Committee for consideration.”59 Thus, despite the fact that the court of
appeals is permitted to delegate its rulemaking authority and has done so in
the past, it is not legally bound to do so in the future.
The promulgation processes in many other states are not as highly
formalized and often differ in the roles assigned to various parties.60 In some
states, rulemaking authority is delegated to the state bar; in California, for
example, the California Supreme Court retains authority to approve rules of
professional conduct but the State Bar of California is charged with
promulgating them.61 In other states, there may be multiple committees to
which rulemaking authority is delegated, such as in South Carolina, where
the state uses both a state bar association Professional Responsibility
Committee62 and a Commission on the Profession63 established by the
judiciary.64 The roles of the judiciary and the legislature in regulating the
process can also vary. Here again, California offers an interesting example.
There, the state bar is regulated by legislation—the State Bar Act65—as
opposed to rules promulgated by the state’s highest court. Mandatory sunset
provisions, in which professional regulatory agencies are automatically
terminated unless reauthorized, are another way in which judicial and
legislative oversight of the legal profession may interact.66
We lack both a theoretical framework for cataloging this variation and
empirical analysis of its influence in practice,67 making this an area ripe for
further investigation. What is clear, however, is that variation in the
regulation and practice of the rule promulgation process can substantially
affect who the decision makers are, the extent to which members of the bar
or the public are able to intervene, and the transparency with which the
promulgation process is carried out. These factors may be consequential for
the substance of regulations governing the legal profession.68 Moreover, in
states where the process is less formalized, there is an opportunity for
59. MD. CT. R. 16-701(g) (emphasis added).
60. See sources cited infra Appendix.
61. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 6076–77 (West 2020).
62. Professional Responsibility Committee, S.C. BAR, https://www.scbar.org/lawyers/
sections-committees-divisions/committees/professional-responsibility-committee/
?edit_off=true [https://perma.cc/8D3S-24BN] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021) (explaining that the
committee is charged with reviewing “laws and rules regulating the practice of law”).
63. S.C. APP. CT. R. 420 (establishing the Chief Justice’s Commission on the Profession
and providing guidelines controlling its composition).
64. See, e.g., Email from Elizabeth Chambliss, Professor, Univ. of South Carolina Sch. of
L. to Harrison Weimer (Sept. 3, 2020) (on file with author) (describing the rule promulgation
process in South Carolina).
65. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 6600–43.
66. See, e.g., Robert J. Derocher, State Bar of Texas’ Sunset Review: A Validation, and a
Challenge, BAR LEADER, July–Aug. 2002, at 6, 6 (describing a sunset review of the Texas
bar).
67. But see John S. Dzienkowski & John M. Golden, Reasoned Decisionmaking for Legal
Ethics Regulation, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1148–49 (2021); Leslie C. Levin, The Politics
of Lawyer Regulation: The Case of Malpractice Insurance, 33 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 969,
973 (2020) (using case studies investigating variation in state requirements regarding
malpractice insurance to consider how and when states will adopt “public-regarding” laws).
68. Levin, supra note 67, at 978–80.
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variation over time and across substantive proposals; while this provides
opportunities to customize the process according to the scope and content of
particular proposals, it also suggests that there is little consideration of
universal evidence-based best practices.
II. TOWARD EVIDENCE-BASED PROMULGATION
In this part, I consider how empirical evidence might enhance the design
of state rule promulgation processes for rules of professional conduct.
Specifically, I consider best practices for rulemaking adopted from other
contexts, ways to integrate external expertise, mechanisms for formalizing
consumer protection, and the importance of directing attention to the
composition of rulemaking bodies.
A. Best Practices for Rulemaking
To a large extent, the issues involved in developing regulations for the
legal profession parallel those that arise in administrative rulemaking more
broadly. The Administrative Procedures Act69 (APA) outlines several core
tenets that undergird the administrative rulemaking process at the federal
level.70 These include advance notice of proposed rulemaking, a period for
comments from the public, and dissemination of the final rule.71 In some
cases, the APA also requires that agencies offer evidence in support of the
adopted rule.72
Many of these elements are apparent in the rulemaking process adopted by
the ABA, where much of the debate regarding proposed rules is centered.
Some aspects have also been adopted at the state level. However, there is no
similar set of prescribed practices that has been broadly accepted in the
context of the professional regulation of lawyers. Not surprisingly, debates
have emerged on key issues, such as how the evidentiary burden supporting
the adoption of new rules should be allocated.73
The ABA has opined on best practices for administrative rulemaking.74 It
could draw on this expertise to support states seeking to enhance the
processes through which state rules of professional conduct are generated and
adopted.75 Other bar associations, academics, and interested parties could
also address the need for evidence-based best practices.

69. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06.
70. See Richard J. Pierce Jr., Rulemaking and the Administrative Procedure Act, 32 TULSA
L. REV. 185, 186 (1996).
71. Id. at 186–87.
72. Id. at 187.
73. Green, supra note 26, at 1117–18.
74. See, e.g., Christopher J. Walker, Modernizing the Administrative Procedure Act, 69
ADMIN. L. REV. 629 (2017) (summarizing ABA recommendations for updates to the APA).
75. See Dzienkowski & Golden, supra note 67, at 1148.
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B. Integration of External Expertise
In addition to general best practices for rulemaking, a second issue facing
states seeking to enhance their promulgation processes is whether and how
to incorporate external expertise. Currently, many states overcome any
deficits in their substantive expertise by relying heavily on the organized bar.
But this approach raises questions about the organized bar’s ability to look
beyond its own interests in support of regulations that serve the public
interest.
Several alternatives exist that could allow for the integration of external
expertise into the promulgation process. Professor Eli Wald suggests that the
Conference of Chief Justices could generate drafts of model rules, thus
displacing the organized bar as the primary source of regulation.76 The
Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System advocates the
role of a third-party regulator.77 Professor Andrew Kaufman has suggested
additional roles for the National Center for State Courts and the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.78 Each of these approaches offers
a mechanism for incorporating expertise from sources other than the ABA
and state bar associations.
Relatedly, a shift toward evidence-based regulation requires greater
engagement with empirical data and analysis. This is a task for which state
supreme courts are not necessarily well suited. Although focused on the
substance of regulation, scholars have offered several suggestions for how to
enhance the availability of relevant empirical data and analysis. Professor
Carole Silver proposes that the American Bar Foundation could take on the
task of aggregating and analyzing data or alternatively, suggests greater
collaboration with empirical scholars directly to meet this need.79 Professor
Elizabeth Chambliss also suggests a role for academics, in addition to
pointing out the utility of task forces and independent program evaluators.80
To move toward evidence-based promulgation, state supreme courts could
benefit from accessing external expertise. Additional attention is needed to
define the processes through which they do so.

76. Wald, supra note 3, at 157–58.
77. GILLIAN HADFIELD & LUCY RICCA, INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL
SYS., INDEPENDENT REGULATOR OF LEGAL SERVICES POLICY OUTLINE iv (2019), https://iaals.
du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/iaals_independent_regulator_of_legal_
services_policy_outline.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5U7-L5EH].
78. Andrew L. Kaufman, Ethics 2000—Some Heretical Thoughts, 2001 J. PRO. LAW.
(SYMP. ISSUE) 1, 5–6.
79. Carole Silver, What We Don’t Know Can Hurt Us: The Need for Empirical Research
in Regulating Lawyers and Legal Services in the Global Economy, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1009,
1074–75 (2010).
80. Chambliss, supra note 24, at 336, 338–39, 345.
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C. Formalizing Consumer Protection
The current promulgation process for disciplinary rules is dominated by
lawyers and includes an outsized role for the organized bar.81 Much of the
critique of this process—and the rules adopted through it—is that professed
concerns for consumer protection cloak naked self-interest. The call for
empirical evidence of the effects of substantive reforms is designed, in part,
to force the profession to more objectively analyze consumer protection
issues. In this section, I consider how the promulgation process might be
reformed to enhance consideration of consumer perspectives.
Requirements for the inclusion of nonlawyers within the bodies charged
with generating or reviewing proposed reforms to the rules of professional
conduct is one way to promote consumers’ interests (as well as to help
counter antitrust concerns). However, the mechanisms through which such
individuals join rulemaking bodies and the processes through which their
advice is given and documented could affect the extent to which consumer
protection is prioritized.
Similar concerns about responsiveness to consumer needs are addressed
by the Internal Revenue Service through its Taxpayer Advocate Service. The
service is an independent organization within the agency devoted to
protecting taxpayers’ rights.82 The agency maintains offices in every state to
engage with taxpayers who have problems and it presents an annual report to
Congress identifying systemic issues.83 This institutionalizes a voice for
consumer concerns and generates a supporting evidentiary record.
Formalizing consumer representation within the promulgation process for
rules of professional conduct presents an alternative to relying on members
of the bar to overcome their conflicts of interest and protect the consumer
interest, assuming judges will appoint individuals who can represent the
public interest on an ad hoc basis, or counting on consumer-focused entities
to mobilize in response to proposed reforms.
D. Composition of Rulemakers
Finally, empirical evidence could facilitate greater consideration of the
composition of rulemaking bodies. This could include identifying the
characteristics of those individuals involved in the promulgation process, as
well as incorporating evidence-based approaches to ensure these bodies are
populated such that they are capable of representing the interests of the
profession and the public.

81. See Green, supra note 26, at 1156 (“The [disciplinary] rules are drafted by bar
associations, promulgated by courts, enforced by disciplinary or grievance committees, and
interpreted by both courts and bar committees. These institutions are dominated by lawyers.”);
Wolfram, supra note 5, at 16–18.
82. See We’re Your Voice at the IRS, TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV., https://taxpayeradvocate.
irs.gov [https://perma.cc/924R-3B2V] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
83. See Who We Are, TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV., https://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/
about-us [https://perma.cc/AP8D-LTNS] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
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Because state supreme court justices are ultimately responsible for the
promulgation of rules of professional conduct, such questions are logically
directed to them. Understanding their characteristics—including how they
are selected and how they retain their positions, their political ideologies and
formative professional experiences, and their individual attributes—may
help to inform decisions about the extent to which they should carry out their
responsibilities independently, with input from additional advisors, or
through delegation.
Many state judges are elected through a process that has become
increasingly politicized in some places.84 Institutional analyses of
professional regulation note that elections, while often criticized as limiting
judges’ independence, may enhance justices’ accountability to the public.85
Future analysis might investigate the relationship between the methods for
selecting judges and the types of procedures they use in assessing reforms to
professional rules, with implications for ongoing debates about the optimal
approach to judicial selection.
The role of political ideology, while emphasized in the context of judicial
adjudication, is also relevant in the context of rulemaking.86 Finally, in light
of criticisms that professional regulations are increasingly disconnected from
the realities of modern legal practice,87 consideration of justices’ professional
experiences prior to joining the bench may also be relevant. Understanding
the representativeness of justices might influence the types of procedures that
are most likely to result in professional regulation that serves the needs of
lawyers and the public interest.
In addition, rulemakers’ individual characteristics are also relevant.
Professor Brooke Coleman has recently written about the importance of
racial, ethnic, and gender diversity on the committee charged with overseeing
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.88 She argues that greater diversity
would result in better rules89 and it is essential to ameliorate our history of
exclusion.90 Similar arguments could be made in the context of professional
regulatory rulemaking. State courts are dominated by white men.91 While
the level of racial, ethnic, and gender representation on state courts varies

84. HERBERT M. KRITZER, JUSTICES ON THE BALLOT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN STATE
SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS 200–01 (2015).
85. Barton, supra note 36, at 1185–86.
86. See Brooke D. Coleman, #Sowhitemale: Federal Civil Rulemaking, 113 NW. U. L.
REV. ONLINE 407, 409 (2019).
87. See, e.g., Jessica K. Steinberg et al., Judges and the Deregulation of Legal Services,
89 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315, 1318–24 (2021); Wald, supra note 3, at 158.
88. See Coleman, supra note 86, at 424.
89. Id. at 427 (noting that “in a context like federal civil rulemaking, diverse decisionmaking bodies are ‘smarter’”).
90. Id. at 429.
91. Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, Measuring Justice in State Courts: The
Demographics of the State Judiciary, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1887, 1907 fig.7, 1908 tbl.5 (2017)
(comparing white men’s representation in the state judiciary to their representation in the
population and noting the racial and gender composition of appellate state courts).
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across states, in no state is the state judiciary as diverse as the state population
on these dimensions.92
Together, these considerations may militate in favor of a process in which
state supreme courts delegate at least a portion of their rulemaking authority.
Future work could identify best practices for populating these subsidiary
bodies or for otherwise ensuring that diverse perspectives are incorporated
into the rule promulgation process.
III. EVIDENCE-BASED PROMULGATION IN PRACTICE
Proponents suggest that the adoption of evidence-based substantive
regulation will not only enhance the quality of professional regulation but
serves to counter challenges to the profession’s right to self-regulate.93 A
similar argument can be made with regard to evidence-based promulgation;
enhancing the rule promulgation process could address criticism of
professional regulation while also improving substantive regulation by
elevating the process through which it is proposed, reviewed, and adopted.
However, it is important to recognize that changes to the promulgation
process may not result in dramatic changes to the substance of regulations;
even if they do, they may not address the underlying concerns motivating
calls for reform. For example, the Washington State Supreme Court
announced in the summer of 2020 that the Limited License Legal
Technicians program, once heralded as the “way of the future of law,”94 will
sunset.95 Although this program was a function of more than simply the
state’s rules of professional conduct, its rise and fall illustrate how
innovations made possible through such reforms face additional hurdles—
cultural, economic, or practical—in successfully altering the legal
profession.96
Moreover, it is possible that a move toward evidence-based promulgation
is simply not feasible under the current state-based approach to professional
regulation. Attempts to undertake structural reforms in the context of

92. TRACEY E. GEORGE & ALBERT H. YOON, AM. CONST. SOC’Y, THE GAVEL GAP: WHO
SITS IN JUDGMENT ON STATE COURTS tbl.A-14 (2016), https://gavelgap.org/pdf/gavel-gapreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/PBL4-FLA7].
93. See Chambliss, supra note 24, at 318.
94. Mary Jeutten, The Limited License Legal Technician Is the Way of the Future of Law,
ABA J. (Dec. 8, 2017, 8:30 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
the_limited_license_legal_technician_story_start_with_why [https://perma.cc/C2GA-6D63].
95. Letter from Debra L. Stephens, C.J., Wash. State Sup. Ct., to Stephen R. Crossland,
Chair, Ltd. License Legal Technician Bd., Terra Nevitt, Interim Exec. Dir., Wash. State Bar
Ass’n & Rajeev Majumdar, President, Wash. State Bar Ass’n (June 5, 2020),
https://www.abajournal.com/files/Stephens_LLLT_letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/JS3Q-AJRK].
96. See Lyle Moran, How the Washington Supreme Court’s LLLT Program Met Its
Demise, ABA J. (July 9, 2020), https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/how-washingtonslimited-license-legal-technician-program-met-its-demise
[https://perma.cc/A67E-3KVH]
(describing how the Limited License Legal Technicians program was barred from expanding
into practice areas beyond family law and struggled to attract enough applicants to achieve
self-sufficiency).
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professional regulation have not always been successful,97 for a variety of
reasons.98 In contrast to the states-as-laboratories ethos proposed by the
ABA, a more centralized approach to regulating the profession might
actually be more likely to incorporate the types of best practices advocated
in this Article.
CONCLUSION
The legal profession is not inclined toward change. As Professor Wald
writes, the drag of history and tradition are particularly strong barriers to
change for a profession “that builds on respect for authority, established
rules, hierarchical systems, and history, as well as on precedent.”99 Yet
threats to the profession’s claim to self-regulation may overcome this inertia.
Acknowledging this pressure, ABA Resolution 115 embraces the idea of
states as laboratories and encourages them to undertake forays into new
forms of professional regulation that expand access to legal services.100
Through its emphasis on evidence-based regulations, it also envisions an
iterative process in which reforms are evaluated on an ongoing basis.
The process through which such reforms will be generated, evaluated, and
adopted has received less attention. While scholars and the organized bar
have recognized the need for additional empirical investigation on the effects
of regulatory reforms and on topics that serve as the basis for the substance
of potential reforms, these arguments have generally not been extended to
the rule promulgation process. In this Article, I advocate a parallel shift
toward evidence-based promulgation. The hope is that such a shift might
justify the profession’s long claim to self-regulation by enhancing the
substance of professional regulation.

97. See, e.g., John P. Sahl, The Public Hazard of Lawyer Self-Regulation: Learning from
Ohio’s Struggle to Reform Its Disciplinary System, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 65, 82 (1999)
(recounting the failures of an attempt to reform Ohio’s disciplinary process).
98. Bruce A. Green, ABA Ethics Reform from “MDP” to “20/20”: Some Cautionary
Reflections, 2009 J. PRO. LAW. (SYMP. ISSUE) 1, 11.
99. Wald, supra note 9, at 523.
100. Given the controversy and compromise revisions to the resolution, one could debate
the depth of the organized bar’s devotion to these ideas.
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APPENDIX
Sources of Authority for Rule Promulgation by State
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona

Arkansas

California

Colorado

Connecticut
Delaware
Florida

Georgia

Hawai’i
Idaho
Illinois

Authority for Rule Promulgation
ALA. PRO. CONDUCT. R.
ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 15; ALASKA BAR R. 62.
ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 28.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-11-116 (2020);
Committee on Civil Practice, ARK. JUDICIARY,
https://www.arcourts.gov/administration/boards-committees/committeecivil-practice [https://perma.cc/MSQ3-KJ94] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021);
In re Ark. Bar Ass’n Petition to Amend Rules 1.2, 4.2 & 4.3 of the Ark.
Rules of Pro. Conduct, No. CV–16–187 (Ark. May 12, 2016).
CAL. BUS. & PRO. CODE §§ 6011–15, 6076–77 (West 2020);
2020–21 Board of Trustees, STATE BAR OF CAL.,
https://www.calbar.ca.gov/About-Us/Who-We-Are/Board-ofTrustees/Roster [https://perma.cc/HU6B-W7ZD]
(last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-2-110 (2020);
Order Establishing the Colorado Supreme Court Standing Committee on
the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct (Colo. June 24, 2003);
Rules of Professional Conduct Standing Committee, COLO. JUD. BRANCH,
https://www.courts.state.co.us/Courts/Supreme_Court/Committees/Com
mittee.cfm?Committee_ID=24 [https://perma.cc/5625-P3LL]
(last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
Wesley W. Horton et al., Preface to 1 CONNECTICUT PRACTICE SERIES,
SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL RULES (2020 ed.);
Edward L. Johnson Jr., Connecticut Bar Association History: 1975–
2000, 75 CONN. BAR J. 185, 194–95 (2001).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 161; (2020) DEL. SUP. CT. R. 96.
FLA. BAR R. 1-12.1(a), (f); 1-1.21(f), (g).
GA. BAR R. 5-101; Bob Ambrogi, Georgia Moves Closer to Adopting
Duty of Technology Competence, LAWSITES (Nov. 4, 2019),
https://www.lawsitesblog.com/2019/11/georgia-moves-closer-toadopting-duty-of-technology-competence.html
[https://perma.cc/RR5E-L7LS].
HAW. SUP. CT. R. 17(b);
HAW PRO. CONDUCT R. (HAW. SUP. CT. COMM’N ON PROFESSIONALISM,
Proposed Amendments Draft Sept. 26, 2019).
IDAHO BAR COMM’N R. 906.
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 3.
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Indiana

Iowa

Kansas

Kentucky

Louisiana

Maine

Maryland

Massachusetts

Michigan

Minnesota
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Order Amending Indiana Rules of Court (Ind. Dec. 19, 2019);
Proposed Rule Amendments, IND. CTS.,
https://www.in.gov/judiciary/2685.htm [https://perma.cc/F5GB-2P7N]
(last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
Order: Request for Public Comment on Proposed Amendments to
Chapter 32, Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct (Iowa Aug. 1, 2019).
Proposed Rule 241: Rules Relating to the Lawyers’ Fund for Client
Protection, KAN. SUP. CT.,
https://www.kscourts.org/KSCourts/media/KsCourts/Rules_Open_Comm
ent/Proposed-Rule-241.pdf?ext=.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J6GZ-VPSU] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
KY. CONST. § 116;
KBA Ethics 2000 Committee Report, KY. BAR ASS’N,
https://www.kybar.org/page/KBAEthics2000Rpt [https://perma.cc/S9GLD3PS] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
Dane S. Ciolino, Introductory Materials: Historical Background of
Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct, LA. LEGAL ETHICS,
https://lalegalethics.org/louisiana-rules-of-professionalconduct/introductory-materials
[https://perma.cc/5TJ3-Y9UB] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics, STATE OF ME. JUD. BRANCH
(May 6, 2019), https://www.courts.maine.gov/about/committees/judicethics.html [https://perma.cc/WN2M-QCNS].
MD. CONST. art. IV, § 18(a);
MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 13-301 (LexisNexis 2020);
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, MD. CTS.,
https://www.mdcourts.gov/rules [https://perma.cc/L8KH-WMA6]
(last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
Mass Sup. Jud. Ct, Rule Changes and Invitations to Comment on
Proposed Rules and Amendments, MASS.GOV,
https://www.mass.gov/service-details/rule-changes-and-invitations-tocomment-on-proposed-rules-and-amendments
[https://perma.cc/6JXE-THWK] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021);
Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Standing Advisory Committee on the Rules of
Professional Conduct, MASS.GOV, https://www.mass.gov/servicedetails/standing-advisory-committee-on-the-rules-of-professional-conduct
[https://perma.cc/H5SV-VUDR] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
Marcia L. Proctor, The Michigan Professional Regulatory System, 74
MICH. BAR J. 144 (1995);
Pro. Ethics Comm., Rule of the Committee, STATE BAR OF MICH. (Jan.
27, 2012), http://www.michbar.org/file/generalinfo/committee_pdfs/
pec_rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3BM-T8DX].
37 DUNNELL MINNESOTA DIGEST Courts § 13.06 (6th ed. Supp. 2020).
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Mississippi
Missouri

Montana

Nebraska
Nevada

New Hampshire

New Jersey

New Mexico
New York

North Carolina

North Dakota

Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
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Rules for Comment, STATE OF MISS. JUDICIARY, https://courts.ms.gov/
research/rules/rulesforcomment/rulesforcomment.php
[https://perma.cc/2ULT-E2L3] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
MO. SUP. CT. R. 7.06; id. r. 5.3(d).
Extensive Updates to Montana Rules of Professional Conduct Adopted
Effective Jan. 1, 2020, STATE BAR OF MONT. (Dec. 19, 2020),
https://www.montanabar.org/news/443124/Extensive-updates-toMontana-Rules-of-Professional-Conduct-adopted-effective-Jan.-12020.htm [https://perma.cc/CZK4-APJD]
NEB. SUP. CT. R. § 1-103.
Order Repealing Rules 150-203.5 of the Supreme Court Rules and
Adopting the Nevada Rules Of Professional Conduct (Nev. Feb. 6, 2006).
Order Adopting Amendments to Court Rules (N.H. July 15, 2019);
Committees––Advisory Committee on Rules, N.H. JUD. BRANCH,
https://www.courts.state.nh.us/committees/adviscommrules/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/ZW82-H62A] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
N.J. SUP. CT., ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS BY THE SUPREME
COURT ON THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE ON ATTORNEY ETHICS AND ADMISSIONS (2016),
https://www.njcourts.gov/notices/2016/n160414a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZK58-ZJ6X].
N.M. SUP. CT. GEN. R. 23-106.1.
ROY D. SIMON, SIMON’S NEW YORK RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
ANNOTATED § 8.251, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2020).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-23 (2020);
Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Professional Conduct, N.C. STATE
BAR, https://www.ncbar.gov/for-lawyers/ethics/proposed-amendmentsto-the-rules-of-professional-conduct [https://perma.cc/W42K-EXAQ]
(last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
N.D. SUP. CT. R. 3.1–5;
Joint Committee on Attorney Standards, STATE OF N.D. CTS.,
https://www.ndcourts.gov/supreme-court/committees/joint-committee-onattorney-standards [https://perma.cc/D8BR-65XZ]
(last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
OH. CONST. art. IV, § 2(B)(1)(g).
OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, § 13 (2021);
Policy Regarding Submission of Rule Changes, OKLA. BAR ASS’N (Apr.
24, 2009), https://www.okbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/
judicial-rule-changes1.pdf [https://perma.cc/GKT4-59GG].
OR. REV. STAT. § 9.490 (2020).
1 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 7.1–10 (2020).
Order In re Proposed Rhode Island Rules of Professional Conduct with
Proposed Comments (R.I. Sept. 13, 2006).
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Tennessee
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S.C. APP. CT. R. 401 (establishing the South Carolina Bar); id. r. 420;
Professional Responsibility Committee, S.C. BAR,
https://www.scbar.org/lawyers/sections-committees-divisions/
committees/professional-responsibility-committee/?edit_off=true
[https://perma.cc/FSL5-LA88] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16-17-3.1A (2020);
Letter from David Gilbertson, C.J., Sup. Ct. of South Dakota, to All
Members of the State Bar (Mar. 9, 2020),
https://www.clsreligiousfreedom.org/sites/default/files/site_files/ABA%2
08.4(g)/Proposed_8.4_Rule_Letter_3_9_20.pdf
[https://perma.cc/45TQ-Q2FC].
Learn About the Development of Rules of Professional Conduct, TENN.
BAR ASS’N, https://www.tba.org/index.cfm? pg=Development-of-RulesProfessional-Conduct
[https:// perma.cc/DP2N-5EC4] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
TEX. GOV. CODE ANN. §§ 81.0871–94 (West 2020).
UTAH SUP. CT. PRO. PRAC. R., ch. 11, art. 1.
Professional Responsibility Board, VT. JUDICIARY,
https://www.vermontjudiciary.org/about-vermont-judiciary/boards-andcommitees/professional-responsibility [https://perma.cc/G8W9-6M9M]
(last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-700 (2020);
JUD. COUNCIL OF VA., 2018 REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND
SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA 7 (2019),
http://www.courts.state.va.us/courtadmin/judpolicies/2018_jcv_report
.pdf [https://perma.cc/PM77-RTLK].

GR 9––Supreme Court Rulemaking and Schedule for Review,
WASH. CTS., https://www.courts.wa.gov/court_rules/?fa=
court_rules.gr9summary [https://perma.cc/U2H7-W8WX]
(last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
W.V. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (highlighting the rule-making authority of the
state’s supreme court);
Rules Order (W. Va. Sept. 29, 2014).
WIS. SUP. CT. I.O.P. IV–V.
Order Amending the Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys at Law
(Wyo. June 25, 2019).

